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POLICE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES:
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION

Procedural due process, the requirement of notice and hearing, has been termed "a developing field of law."' This is an
understatement.
In the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has
decided a plethora of cases symptomatic of a trend toward expanding the application of procedural due process concepts. In
Goldberg v. Kelly' the constitutional protection was afforded to
the status of a welfare recipient. The Court determined that
procedural due process required an evidentiary hearing prior to
the termination of welfare assistance payments. The need to protect public tax revenues was not found sufficiently overwhelming
to justify the possible wrongful deprivation of public aid.
Although the posting of a prohibition against the sale of
liquor to a person would result in a characterization considered a
mark of serious illness to some, the Court found it to be a badge of
disgrace warranting constitutional shelter in Wisconsin v. Constantineou,3 and held that before an individual could be labeled a4
drunk, he is entitled to notice and hearing. In Bell v. Burson,
curtailment of driving privileges was at issue. A Georgia law
permitted suspension of the driver's license of an uninsured
motorist involved in an accident unless a bond was posted. The
Court found that the statute was violative of Fifth Amendment
protections in failing, prior to suspension of the license, to afford
a hearing on the question of fault.
Perhaps the most significant case amplifying due process
protections is Fuentes v. Shevin.5 In Fuentes, the Court held
that a credit purchaser of chattels has a sufficient property interest in them to warrant prohibiting repossession by the creditor without prior notice and hearing. Thus, even a temporary
deprivation of property is enveloped by the constitutional guarantee.
These cases and others have broken new ground in the
formulation of constitutional protections and illustrate the move1 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

400 U.S. 433 (1971).
4 402 U.S. 535 (1971).

5 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The impact of the Fuentes decision is discussed in
Note, Fuentes v. Shevin: New Procedural Safeguards for the Buyer under
Conditional Sales Contracts, 6 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 139 (1972).
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ment toward finding still more unexplored rights buried in the
due process provision. One situation stands out as being particularly vulnerable to constitutional attack - police disciplinary
procedures. In the past few years, the argument for affording
the full panoply of due process protections to a disciplined policeman has begun to crop up. This article will examine the
validity of that argument.,
THE LAW OF DUE PROCESS

The prohibition against the deprivation of property without
due process of law was recognized at least as far back as the
Magna Carta.7 This insulation of rights from arbitrary government action was engrafted into the United States Constitution
by way of the Fifth Amendment, 8 applying to federal action, and
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment,9 imposing similar restrictions on the states. Nearly all state constitutions contain a
provision using identical language or words of the same import
and meaning."0
Case law interpretations unanimously conclude that the
term is not susceptible of precise parameters." Early attempts
at a judicial definition of the phrase indicate that its meaning
12
was taken for granted and did not need any express definition.
A more recent delineation of due process was phrased "the
State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the
values of a free society, can be characterized as due."' 3
This
elusive quality is tolerable when it is observed that due process
is a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule
of law.' 4 Although courts have been unable to capture the
concept in words, the import of the guarantee has developed by
6 The discipline procedures implemented by the Chicago Police Department will be scrutinized as representative of police disciplinary practices
generally.
7 Some writers trace the concept back as far as the edict of Conrad II

issued May 28, 1037. R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1 (1926). Mr. Mott's
treatise contains a well documented account of the etymology of the phrase
and the history of its inclusion as a constitutional right.
S "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ...
"
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9"No State shall ....
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30 Illinois is no exception: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection
of the laws." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
11E g Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Goodwill Station,
Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275 (1949) ; Barnett v. County of Cook, 388 Ill. 251, 255,
57 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1944).
12 R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 192 (1926).
1"Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
14See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
15 The phrase 'due process of law' has, on its face, but a procedural
aspect, relating to proceedings before judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals,

and in the early cases, appeal to that phrase was made from that standpoint only.

It was not until the second half of the 19th century that a
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a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Through this
method, certain features of due process have been established.
These attributes pertain to (1) the minimal requirements of due
process, (2) the persons and agencies under a duty to observe
due process procedures and (3) the persons or property rights

within the zone of protection.
Minimal Requirements of Due Process
A discussion of minimal due process requirements necessitates a distinction between its substantive and procedural aspects. 15 Substantively, due process can be said to mean that
fundamental fairness which is essential to the very concept of
justice. This fundamental fairness is violated when the government deprives a person of property "by an act that has no reasonable relation to any proper governmental purpose, or which

is so far beyond the necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary
exercise of governmental power.""'
Thus, in substantive law,
due process imposes a standard of reasonableness as a limitation

upon the exercise of the police power by government.
The central meaning of the procedural aspect of the pro-

vision is more easily ascertainable: "Parties whose rights are
to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must be notified.' ' 17 This general statement
is nearly as vague as the due process language of the Constitution itself. However, at least six elements of notice and hearing
are identifiable.
First, the notice must be timely and adequate. A notice is
timely if it provides sufficient time to enable the accused to
prepare his case, affords him an opportunity to be present, and

occurs at a time when the deprivation of rights can be prevented."' To be adequate the notice must be likely to be re19 and it must detail the reasons
ceived and plain to understand
20
for the proposed action.
Second, the hearing stage must be effective in affording to
contrary view came definitely to be taken.
inherent rights asserted itself.

. .

The doctrine of natural and

. [I]n Wynehamer v. People, 1856,

13 N.Y. 378, the court decided that the police power is definitely limited
by the constitutional provision for due process, and that that provision
has, accordingly, a substantive aspect as well as a procedural one.
State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 343, 84 P.2d 767, 770 (1938).
16 Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 97, 178 S. 799, 804, appeal
dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
17 Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
18 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 267 (1970) ; In 'e Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967).
19 Griffin v. County of Cook, 369 Ill. 380, 392, 16 N.E.2d 906, 912 (1938).
20 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
It should be noted
that the procedural elements cannot be completely isolated from the concept
of substantive due process. Thus, the fundamental test for the sufficiency of
a notice is whether it is fair and just to the parties involved. See In re
Bergman's Survivorship, 60 Wyo. 355, 376, 151 P.2d 360, 368 (1944).
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the accused an opportunity to defend by confronting adverse
witnesses and by presenting his own oral arguments and witnesses. These protections are of particular importance where
deprivation of property -rests on misleading factual premises or
on a misapplication of policies to the facts of the particular case.21
The requirement of confrontation and cross-examination has
been specifically applied to the situation where a person may be
22
deprived of his livelihood on the testimony of a single witness.
Third, the opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the
nature of the case and the capacities of those who are to be heard.
Oral presentations are more flexible than written submissions,
in that they permit the accused to adapt his statements to counter
his adversary's arguments as well as overcome the problems
encountered when the accused lacks the education necessary to
write effectively.23
Fourth, "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. 12 4 The Court, in Goldberg v. Kelly, did not construe
this statement to mean that counsel must be provided, but rather
that an accused must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so
desires. The Court explained that counsel could assist the accused by delineating the issues, presenting factual contentions in
an orderly manner, conducting cross-examination and generally
25
safeguarding the interests of the accused.
2
Fifth, the decision maker must be impartial. 1
Sixth, and finally, the impartial determiner should state
7
the reasons for the decision and indicate the evidence relied on.1
This statement, however, need not amount to a full opinion nor
are formal findings of fact and conclusions of law required. 28
This list of basic elements is not exhaustive. Other refinements to the essentials of due process have been judicially determined under the overriding qualification that all procedures
must conform to the nature of the case and the particular
persons and property rights involved. Consequently, the requirements outlined above have been somewhat modified by a
consideration of the type of tribunal conducting the hearing.
Persons and Agencies Bound by Due Process Procedures
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments expressly bind the
21

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).

22 See Willner v. Comm. on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103
(1963).

23 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955) ; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
27 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
28 Id.
24
25
20
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federal government and the states to the restrictions of the due
process guarantees. These constitutional mandates, coupled
with a desire to preclude arbitrary exercise of power by any
form of government, have supported the imposition of the duty
to observe due process upon the state and federal governments in
every one of their branches, agencies and political subdivisions.
When dealing with a multifarious governmental system,
however, litigation to ascertain more precise boundaries for the
application of the due process principle is inevitable. In general, the prohibition attaches to municipalities2' and administrative agencies3 ° and their officers. 31 But the mere fact that the
forum involved is classified as an administrative agency does not
raise the status of a hearing to that of a trial. Various circumstances must first be considered to determine the extent to which
due process protections will be applied. Among these factors
are the function the agency is performing, the opportunity for
appeal to a judicial tribunal and the nature of the right involved.
Due process procedures are not invoked unless the agency
is performing in a quasi-judicial capacity; an agency which is
merely conducting an investigation will not be inhibited by due
process. The more closely the agency's role approaches the
judicial functions of a court, the more strictly due process requirements are enforced. The duties of a board, as defined by
its enabling statute, assist in ascertaining the purpose of the
agency. Quasi-judicial functions are those lying midway between judicial acts and purely ministerial ones; quasi-judicial
functions require an element of discretion. 32 Where discretion
is present in the exercise of its power, the agency or board
comes within the ambit of those bound by the due process duty.
Investigatory proceedings do not involve discretion, and
therefore, do not invoke full due process protections. This point
was firmly established in Hannah v. Larche,3 where the United
States Supreme Court distinguished adjudicative functions from
those which are purely investigatory by listing what an investigatory agency does not do:
It does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor
does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does not
make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or
property. In short, [it] does not and cannot take any affirmative
29 East St. Louis Ry. v. City of East St. Louis, 13 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.
1926).
30 Italia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N.E. 198
(1926).
31 People v. Beleastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
32See Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 348-49, 18 N.E.2d 709,
713-14 (1939).
33363 U.S. 420 (1960).

116

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 7:111

action which will affect an individual's legal rights. The only
purpose of its existence is to find facts which may subsequently
34

be used as the basis for legislative or executive action.
It is reasonable to infer that a non-investigative body, i.e., an adjudicative agency, is one which performs some or all of these
tasks. Thus, when a board is empowered to take any affirmative
action affecting the legal rights of an individual, hearings before
that board should conform to the minimal due process standards.
There is a compelling need for a full and fair hearing where
no opportunity for appeal is granted. The right to review
itself is not essential to due process, provided the constitutional
guarantees have already been afforded by the tribunal of first
instance. 35 Accordingly, the constitutional requirements are
satisfied if due process is afforded at the administrative hearing
stage or if there is provision for judicial review.
The right involved in a cause is necessarily an important
consideration. Where the proceedings may affect a property right,
the opportunity for potential harm commands stringent constitutional protection of that right. Therefore, in an administrative
proceeding where the agency functions are quasi-judicial or adjudicative as opposed to investigatory, where there is no provision
for judicial review and where property rights are involved, the
need for due process protections is imperative.
Persons and Property Rights Protected
The requirement that a property right be involved is not
limited to administrative proceedings. The right to a hearing in
any case attaches only to the deprivation of an interest encompassed within the constitutional protection.36 The Amendments
do not expressly specify the property rights protected, but their
general policy is apparent and the rights entitled to the constitutional comforts are broadly defined . 7 A person's occupation,
labor and the income therefrom are included within this sweeping
definition. 38 And while there is no constitutional right to govern34Id. at 441.

35 Chicago v. Cohn 326 Ill. 372 158 N.E. 118 (1927).
36 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
37
'Property' has been defined to include every interest anyone may
have in any and everything that is the subject of ownership by man,
together with the right to freely possess, use, enjoy or dispose of the
same.

.

.

.

The privilege of every citizen to use his property according

to his own will is both a liberty and a property right. The 'liberty'
guaranteed by the constitution includes not only freedom from servitude
or restraint, but also the right of every man to be free in the use of
his power and faculties, to pursue such occupation or business as he may
choose, and to use his property in his own way and for his own purposes,
subject only to the restraint necessary to secure the common welfare.
Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 393 Ill. 246, 256, 65 N.E.2d
805, 812 (1946).
38 People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 572, 95 N.E.2d 888, 893 (1951); Du Page
County v. Henderson, 402 Ill. 179, 184, 83 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1949) ; Lasdon
v. Hallihan, 377 Ill. 187, 195, 36 N.E.2d 227, 231 (1941).
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9
the
ment employment, in Slochower v. Board of Education"
Supreme Court recognized that public employees are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition to these three factors - the minimal requirements, the agencies bound and the property rights protected there is one other aspect of due process which deserves attention.
Although due process is a two-pronged concept, its substantive
and procedural aspects often overlap. 40 The balancing of interest test earmarking substantive due process is applicable to
procedural due process as well. Since the procedures to be employed in any given situation are not inflexible, the assessment
of constitutional satisfaction is a balancing of the competing
interests of the governmental entity with those of the individual
involved. 4 1 If the interests of the government outweigh those
of the individual, a lesser standard of due process protection is
tolerated.
With this survey of due process in mind, the disciplinary
procedures employed by the Chicago Police Department may be
examined.

POLICE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
4
An analysis of the rules used in disciplinary procedures '
applicable to the Chicago policeman demands an-examination of
the statutory authority to promulgate these rules. The superintendent of police derives his power from statute:
The superintendent of police shall be the chief executive
officer of the police department . . . The superintendent shall
be responsible for the general management and control of the
police department and shall have full and complete authority to
administer the department in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the city, the laws3 of the state, and the rules and regulations of the police boardA
Illinois statutes also authorize the selection of a Police Board
and vest in it the power to hear disciplinary actions involving
police officers. 44 By these provisions the Board is empowered to
adopt rules and regulations for the governance of the police

39 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
40 See note 20 supra.
41 Boulware v. Battaglia, 344 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd 478
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973).
42 A statistical survey of the types of charges brought against policemen
in another large city and the disposition of the actions may be found at:
Cohen, Criminology: The Police Internal System of Justice in New York
City, 63 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 54 (1972).
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-7-3.2

(1971).

44 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-7-3.1 (1971).
The grant of authority contained in §§ 3-7-3.1 and 3-7-3.2 is amplified by the Municipal Code of Chicago,
§ 11-5 (designating the superintendent of police as chief administrator of
the police department) and § 11-3 (setting forth the powers of the Police
Board).
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department, while the authority to administer its operations is
reserved to the superintendent of police. The Police Board may
direct police department operations only within the confines of
4
section 10-1-18.1. 5
The application of section 10-1-18.1 is limited to those situations where a policeman may be discharged or suspended for
more than thirty days. In this event, the accused officer is entitled to a hearing before the Police Board which carries with it
the full panoply of procedural due process protections: the officer
must receive written notice, he may be represented by counsel,
he has the right of confrontation, he may cross-examine witnesses and present evidence in his defense, and he is entitled
without charge to a record of any hearing, interrogation or
examination. After the hearing, the decision of the Board is
certified to and enforced by the superintendent of police.
The last sentence of the section is of particular note:
"Nothing in this Section limits the power of the superintendent
to suspend a subordinate for a reasonable period not exceeding
30 days."'46 The import of the statute is to mandate a Police
Board hearing with full rights where discharge or a thirty-one
day suspension is recommended. But where a suspension of
thirty days or less is advocated, the Police Board is not empowered to take any action, rather, disciplinary action is at the discretion of the superintendent.
An exercise of discretion by the Chicago superintendent of
police may be manifest in a "general order."
A "general
order" is an internal directive issued by the superintendent
which affects the entire department. General Order No. 67-21
and the subsequent amendments thereto set forth the disciplinary
and summary punishment procedures presently in use by the
Chicago Police Department. 41 This order provides for the investigating and the processing of all complaints alleging police
misconduct regardless of whether the source is a citizen, a supervising officer, or any other member of the Department. 4 An
45
The board's power to adopt rules and regulations for the governance of the police department does not include the authority to administer or direct the operations of the police department or the superintendent of police, except as provided in Section 10-1-18.1.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-7-3.1 (1971).
46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-18.1 (1971) (emphasis added).
47 The order applies only to violations of the Department Rules and
Regulations. However, these rules are far reaching and include "sustained
violations of the law and other irregularities which are wilful, devious or
serious in nature or involve the integrity of the Department." General Order
No. 67-21H, § 3-S-3 (Oct. 23, 1972), amending General Order No. 67-21

(June 28, 1967). Thus, the order contains provisions for procedures where
a violation of the Illinois Criminal Code is alleged. General Order No. 67-21,
§ IV-G; General Order No. 67-21E, § II-E-R (May 1, 1970),

General Order No. 67-21.
48 General Order No. 67-21, § II.

amending
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investigator is assigned to conduct the probe and, when warranted, he may seek assistance from other members of his unit
or from the staff of the Internal Investigation Division. ' The
investigation is required to be "complete and expeditious" and
must conform to the elaborate directions detailed in the order. 51
The procedures to be employed include taking written statements
from the accused, witnesses and the complainant ;5,administering
a breathalyzer test when drinking has been alleged ;52 ordering
the accused to submit to a polygraph test when an alleged crime
has occurred ;5-and complying with complex reporting and ap54
proval procedures.
Upon completion of the inquiry, the investigating officer
classifies the original complaint as either "unfounded" (allegation is false or not factual), "exonerated" (incident occurred
but was lawful and proper), "not sustained" (insufficient evidence either to prove or disprove allegation), or "sustained"
(allegation is supported by sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action.) 55 When classified as "sustained," the investigator may further recommend a reprimand, suspension for a
specific number of days or separation. 6
It should be noted that this determination is made after
the investigation has been completed. Only then is it known
whether or not a Police Board hearing is mandated. If the recommended action is a thirty day or less suspension, there is no
right to a full hearing before the Police Board. General Order
No. 67-21 sets forth the procedure to be employed in this event
by creating a Complaint Review Panel.51
The Police Board consists of five persons appointed by the
mayor with the consent of the city council. 58 The Complaint
Review Panel, on the other hand, consists of three persons who
are members of the force.55 The rank of these presiding officers
is dependent upon the rank of the accused. When the accused
is of the rank of sergeant or above, two of the three panel members must be of "exempt" rank. 60 "Exempt" rank is accorded to
high-ranking officers who obtained their positions by executive
appointment rather than through the civil service procedure.
Appointment is accorded to those "persons whom he [the super49 General
50 General
51 General
52 General
5 General
54General
55 General
56 General
57General

Order No. 67-21, §§ III-B-2g(1), IV-A.
Order No. 67-21, § IV-A-2.
Order No. 67-21, § IV-H.
Order No. 67-21, § IV-E.
Order No. 67-21, § VI-D.
Order No. 67-21, § V.
Order No. 67-21, § IV-J.
Order No. 67-21, § IV-M.
Order Nos. 67-21H, § 1-1 and 67-21E, § II.
REV.
STAT. ch. 24, § 3-7-3.1 (1971).
58 ILL.
59 General Order No. 67-21H, § 1-1.
60 Id.
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intendent of police] feels will carry out his policies. "' 6 1 Further"serve in such capacity at the pleasure of
more, these persons 62
the chief executive.
The opportunity for a hearing before the Complaint Review
Panel is not automatic. When the recommended action is thirty
days suspension or less, the accused's commanding officer is notified by telephone that the accused officer has twenty-four hours
in which to exercise or waive his right to a Complaint Review
Panel hearing. 6 The request for a hearing must be in the form
of written notice. The accused is also advised that "no legal
'
protection applies.' 64
Although the accused officer may not bring counsel to the
hearing, he may bring with him any other active officer who does
not out-rank the Panel members.65 It is possible for this accompanying officer to be an attorney, but even so, the right to counsel
is not complete. The accompanying officer may assist the accused only at the hearing itself and not, for example, at a polygraph test. Furthermore, although the order permits the accompanying officer to review the reports involved in the case
and remind the accused of factors which could affect his case,
the order specifically prohibits him from cross-examining or
addressing the Department's prosecutbr or any member of the
66
Panel.
The Complaint Review Panel itself is not empowered to
impose any punishment. Its authority is limited to a recommendation of action to the superintendent.6 ' General Order No.
67-21 makes it clear that the entire discretion for the imposition
of any punishment rests with the superintendent. 8
From this review of General Order No. 67-21 several pertinent observations may be made: (1) An extensive investigation
is conducted prior to the Complaint Review Panel hearing. (2)
Some Panel members are of exempt rank, i.e., they are chosen
because of their support of the superintendent. (3) The accused
officer is afforded a hearing only if he so requests in writing. (4)
The full panoply of rights does not attach to the hearing, i.e., as a
substitute for counsel the accused may be accompanied by another policeman and even this right is severely limited. (5) The
final imposition of a penalty is at the discretion of the superintendent.
6 0. W. WILSON, POLIcE ADMINISTRATION 280 (3d ed. 1972).

Id.
63 General Order No. 67-21, § III-B-3 (b).
64 General Order No. 67-21E, § II-E-P.
65 General Order No. 67-21H, § 2-5.
6
6 Id.
62

67

General Order No. 67-21, § III-C-4.

68 General Order No. 67-21, § III-D.
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Based on the premise that Complaint Review findings are
merely advisory, any recommendations made are not subject to
judicial review. General Order No. 67-21 provides for review
by the superintendent and any action he takes in approving and
effecting these recommendations is subject to the appeal process
of the Administrative Review Act. 0 The effectiveness of this
review procedure as it concerns disciplined Chicago policemen
will be discussed in the next section.
DUE PROCESS AND GENERAL ORDER No. 67-21

Entitlement to the Protections
In order to establish that the due process guarantees extend
to Complaint Review Panel hearings, several hurdles must be
surmounted. The first inquiry is whether the situation of the
rebuked officer comes within the zone of the due process protections. Entitlement to the prophylactic procedures requires not
only that a property right within the scope of the provisions be
involved, but also that the body conducting the proceedings be
one that is bound by the constitutional prohibition.
The existence of a property right in discipline situations is
easy enough to establish. Chicago policemen are public employees and are therefore clearly entitled to the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7'1 Fitting the Complaint Review Panel
within the framework of agencies bound to observe the due
process policies, however, presents a greater challenge.
The "enabling statute" creating the Complaint Review Panel
is, in effect, General Order No. 67-21. Although that document
claims to reserve all discretion to the superintendent of police,
it in fact not only authorizes but requires the Panel to make a
determination and recommendation of action to the superintendent. 72 The suggestion that the Panel is devoid of discretion
appears to be false.
It has been argued, and successfully, that the Panel is
merely investigatory 73 and this contention has found support in
69

Id.

70

People ex rel. Dever v. Wilson, 107 Ill. App. 2d 223, 246 N.E.2d 863

(1969).

Slochower v. Bd. of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
The Complaint Review Panel will determine whether the charges
should result in a finding of unfounded, exonerated, not sustained or
sustained and will recommend one of the following actions to the Superintendent:
71

72

a. Further investigation with specific recommendations.
b. Dismissal of the charges.
c. A written reprimand.
d. A suspension for a period not to exceed 30 days.
General Order No. 67-21, § III-C-4 as modified by General Order Nos.
67-21B
7 (July 23, 1968) and 67-21E, § H-C (emphasis added).
3

See discussion in text accompanying notes 98 and 104 infra.
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Hannah v. Larche7
However, a comparison of the activities of
the Complaint Review Panel with those considered characteristic of an investigative body in Hannah, illustrates that the
Complaint Review Panel is far more than an inquirer. Although
it does not issue orders, the Panel does issue "determinations"
which are instrumental in causing an order to be rendered by
the superintendent. Thus, it is capable of making a determination which may potentially deprive an individual of property.
Although it cannot take affirmative action affecting legal rights,
the Panel does issue "recommendations" of affirmative action
affecting legal rights.
Additionally, in view of the elaborate investigation preceding the determination of entitlement to a hearing, it is difficult
to comprehend how the Panel hearing can also be classified as
"investigatory." The Complaint Review Panel session is the
only hearing afforded the officer who may be disciplined for
thirty days or less. In Willner v. Committee on Character and
Fitness,",the Supreme Court indicated that where the determiner
has no hearing of his own, the role of the "advisor" is more than
that of a mere investigator.7

Furthermore, the review of the Complaint Review Panel's
conclusions by the superintendent is conducted in a sterile atmosphere. The superintendent cannot attend all Panel hearings
and must make his final determination from the record, reports
and recommendations supplied to him. He hears no evidence
upon which to base factual decisions. The Panel findings must
necessarily be heavily relied upon in ordering a suspension.
Appeal of the superintendent's orders under the Administrative Review Act 77 is equally unsatisfactory. Section 274 of
that Act provides: "The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima
facie true and correct." Supplementing this legislative restriction is a hesitancy on the part of the courts to substitute their
discretion for that of the administrative officer. In Charles v.
Wilson,7 the Illinois appellate court stated that:
[T]he Superintendent of Police has the responsibility to the
community of securing maximum efficiency from the police force
at all rank levels, and his actions should not be subject to review
by the courts, except to determine whether there was or was not
good faith and a reasonable exercise of discretion7 9
This judicial reluctance to overturn a decision of the superin74363
75 373
76

U.S. 420 (1960).
U.S. 96 (1963).

Id. at 104.

77ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 110, §§ 264 et seq. (1971).
Ill. App. 2d 14, 201 N.E.2d 627 (1964).
Id.at 25-26, 201 N.E.2d at 633.
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tendent strips the appeal process of its effectiveness in preserving
the rights of an accused officer.
That the Chicago policeman facing a Complaint Review
Panel has a property right at stake is obvious. That the investigative nature of the Panel is at best questionable and that the
provisions for judicial review are ineffective has been demonstrated. Accordingly, the admonished officer's need for due
process protections in proceedings before the Complaint Review
Panel is pressing.
Compliance with Minimal Standards
Assuming this conclusion, that the policeman's situation is
one entitling him to due process protections, it remains to be
determined whether or not the minimal requirements of due
process are satisfied by the present procedures.
Notice to the disciplined Chicago policeman is effected by
informing his commanding officer of the pending action by telephone twenty-four hours before the accused must exercise his
option to have a Review Panel hearing. Apparently, although
General Order No. 67-21 does not so state, the supervising officer
is then to notify the accused. Nowhere in the order is it unequivocally stated how, when or where the accused is to be advised
of the possible action against him if the complaint is classified as
"sustained" with a recommended suspension of thirty days or
less. Nor is provision made for informing the accused of the reasons for the action. The inadequacy of this notice procedure is
compounded by the requirement that the accused policeman submit a written request within twenty-four hours to obtain a hearing before the Complaint Review Panel. The police administration appears to be more concerned with notification to the
disciplining board than with notification to the disciplined
policeman.
Upon exercising his option to appear before the Panel, the
admonished officer becomes entitled to present his "plea." 0 This
would seem to include presenting witnesses and oral arguments
as well as confronting and cross-examining witnesses against
him. But the order does not guarantee these rights.,
The presentation of a plea merely affords a rudimentary opportunity
to be heard at which the accused is not limited to written submissions, but may present his case orally.
The opportunity for assistance of counsel is not flatly denied by the order, but neither is it assured. The order speaks
only of the right to bring another officer to the hearing. In
80 General Order No. 67-21, § III-C-3.

81
In Allen v. City of Greensboro, 322 F. Supp. 873 (M.D.N.C. 1971),
a/I'd 452 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971), similarly worded procedures were at issue.
They were applied so as to deny the accused the right of confrontation.
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practice, an attorney may accompany the accused only at the
grace of the Panel.82 This discretionary practice contravenes
the principle, clearly established in Goldberg, that while counsel
does not have to be provided, the accused should have the right
to obtain counsel of his own. Moreover, in Powell v. Alabama'
the Supreme Court observed that:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing,
and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense.8
The argument raised to support denial of the presence of
counsel is the inconvenience of making the proceeding more
cumbersome. Just how the attendance of an attorney would
bring about this result is not explained by the proponents of the
position. And the United States Supreme Court, itself, does
"not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or
'
otherwise encumber the hearing.' 85
Due process also requires an impartial decision-maker.
The procedures outlined in General Order No. 67-21 do provide
this right. The prohibition that neither the accused nor the
officer accompanying him may outrank any of the Panel members assures that no pressure will be exerted on the hearing
officers. Additionally, no officer may be designated a member
of a panel if the accused is serving under his command. 8
The last requirement for minimal due process protections
is a final statement particularizing the reasons for the ultimate
decision and the evidence relied on. Although the order specifies
procedures for reporting nearly every action to the superintendent, the policeman, who is personally affected by the admonish-.
ment, is ignored.
The Balancing Test
Even if the present procedures fail to meet the minimum
standards of due process, this failure will be tolerated if the
interests of police administration outweigh those of the rebuked
officer.
The arguments supporting the contention that the
administration's interests should prevail, may be placed into
three categories: (1) the convenience argument, (2) the military-discipline argument and (3) the insignificant penalty argument.
The proponents of the convenience view anticipate a dis4

82See Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213, (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd
455 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1972).
83287 U.S. 45 (1932).
84 Id. at 69.
85 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
86 General Order No. 67-21, § III-C-3.
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ruption of disciplinary procedures if every officer were entitled
to due process. This result would not necessarily follow. For
full due process protections to be afforded the Chicago policeman,
General Order No. 67-21 would have to be amended to provide
for notice to the accused before the hearing and after a determination has been made, assure the right of confrontation and
cross-examination and allow the presence of counsel. The additional step of notifying the accused would not seem to place an
intolerable burden on police administration especially in view of
the already complex reporting process. Furthermore, the right
of confrontation and cross-examination should be part of the
accused's plea. It is difficult to understand how fulfillment of
this right could impair the disciplinary process. Finally, the
benefits to the accused of having a skilled and knowledgeable
attorney speak for him heavily outweigh the minute inconvenience of having one more person in the hearing room.
The military-discipline argument is premised on the nature
of the governmental function of enforcing police regulations and
maintaining discipline. This position will be examined later in
this article.
The weakest of the arguments contending that the interests
of efficient police administration outweigh those of the accused
policeman is that a potential suspension of thirty days has relatively little impact on the recipient. It is true that a thirty day
suspension without pay is the maximum penalty which can be
imposed without providing the due process protections afforded
at a Police Board hearing. But even a suspension of a few days
without pay may place a serious burden on the salaried police
officer. It can hardly be contended that the uninterrupted pursuit of one's livelihood is less important than the opportunity to
purchase liquor (Wisconsin v. Constantineau)',87 the continued
possession of a stereo purchased on credit (Fuentes v. Shevin)8 8
or the retention of a driver's license (Bell v. Burson) .89
Although some due process protections are afforded by the
police disciplinary procedures, many others are not, and the
interests of the administration in supervising police activities
are not sufficient to justify withholding the full panoply of due
process. Thus, it would seem from this analysis that the constitutional rights of disciplined policemen are being violated by
the Chicago rules. But the only case to have considered the
point did not so hold.
87400 U.S. 433 (1971).
88 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
89402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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CASE LAW APPLICATION IN DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS

The leading decision construing the Chicago police disciplinary procedures is the 1970 case of Grabinger-v. Conlisk.90
The action was brought by two police officers against the superintendent of police and other defendants, seeking money damages
and the expunging of certain official records pertaining to plaintiffs. An investigation was initiated based upon a citizen's
complaint charging plaintiff Grabinger with use of excessive
force while plaintiff Tovar looked on. The investigation and
Complaint Review Panel hearing resulted in the imposition on
each of the plaintiffs of a fifteen day suspension without salary.
Grabinger and Tovar alleged violations of constitutional
rights in that they were refused the opportunity of having
an attorney present at the hearing and that a suspension,
based in part upon their refusal to submit to a polygraph test
without benefit of counsel was arbitrary. The district court
quickly dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
and Sixth Amendment right to counsel contentions. But the
court had to struggle to dismiss the contention that due process
was not observed.
The opinion avoided classifying the Complaint Review Panel
hearing as either "administrative," as urged by the plaintiff
policemen, or as "departmental," as urged by defendant Conlisk.
In doing so the opinion relied on language from Hannah and
stated that the "precise nature of the governmental function
involved, the nature of the proceedings, and the potential burden on those proceedings of the claimed due process rights"
must be the primary considerations in determining the contours
of plaintiffs' due process rights. 91 The characteristics of an investigative hearing enumerated in Hannah were ignored.
In deciding that plaintiffs' due process rights were not
violated, five factors were found to control. The first of these
dealt with the severity of the penalty imposed. The Grabinger
court found the proceedings to have "a relatively limited impact
on any police officer ' ' 9 2 and that the situation was one "where,
at most, some mild form of disciplinary action may occur ' 93 and
where "the maximum punishment is relatively so little. ' 94 Thus,
the court concluded that a potential suspension of thirty days
without pay placed a negligible burden on due process rights.
The second factor concerned the military-discipline argument. The court stated that:
90320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd 455 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1972).
91 Id. at 1219.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at

1220.

Police Disciplinary Procedures

1973]

[A] law enforcement officer is in a peculiar and unusual position
of public trust and responsibility, and by virtue thereof, the
public body has an important interest in expecting the officer to
give frank and honest replies to questions relevant to his fitness
to hold public office.9 5
And that:
The high obligation owed by a policeman to his employer and
his peculiar position in our society certainly must be taken into
account in considering the nature and effect of disciplinary proceedings instituted by the employer. 96
Nowhere did the court explain how a denial of a full hearing
would diminish the policeman's public trust or high obligation.
The tlird factor relied on was the convenience contention.
While the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs would benefit
from the presence of counsel, it stated that granting this privilege would seriously disrupt the disciplinary procedures."7 Again,
the finding was unsubstantiated.
The fourth factor related to the fact that plaintiffs were
given notice and were afforded a hearing. It cannot be denied
that General Order No. 67-21 provides for notice and a rudimentary hearing. But the primary issue was whether that
notice and hearing complied with the requirements of due
process, not whether some notice and some hearing was provided for.
The fifth factor involved the finding that the Complaint
Review Panel function was investigatory in nature, rather than
adjudicative, since the Panel merely made a recommendation
while the superintendent took the final action."8 The court arrived at this conclusion while entirely overlooking the fact that
a complete investigation was conducted prior to the hearing.
Finally, the court also dismissed the contention that basing
the suspension in part upon plaintiffs' refusal to submit to a
polygraph test without the presence of counsel violated due
process. The court employed the same five factors in concluding that the requirement of submission to a polygraph test did
not violate procedural due process. In view of the fact that
plaintiffs had never taken the test, the court refused to decide
whether the use of the test results themselves as the basis for
suspension would constitute an infringement upon due process
protections. 9
While the Grabinger case was pending appeal, 1°° a district
court in North Carolina decided the case of Allen v. City of
95 Id. at 1219.
96 Id. at 1220.
97

Id.

98 Id. at 1219.
99 Id. at 1221-22.

100 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the district
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Greensboro.0 1 Detective Allen had, been removed from the
Youth Division and demoted to the position of patrolman with
a resultant salary decrease. This action was the result of a
finding by the General Board of inquiry that plaintiff Allen had
made improper advances toward a young woman while he was
conducting an official investigation.
The organization and procedures for discipline described
in the Allen case are not unlike the situation found in Chicago.
The Greensboro Chief of Police also dictated the procedures by
way of a general order 10 2 unbound by any statutory restrictions.
The pertinent differences between the Greensboro 'procedures
and those used in Chicago are (1) while the accused Greensboro
police officer may present witnesses and testimony, he is specifically prohibited from bringing legal counsel, personal advisors,
and family members to the hearing and (2) although. the Board
made recommendations to the Greensboro chief of police, the
latter's action was appealable to the city manager, the administrative head of the municipal government, who had final approval.
Although Allen alleged a denial of the right of confrontation in that the complainant was not available for cross-examination at the hearing, the court pointed out that he could have
called her as a witness.
In concluding that Allen was not denied due process, the
court: relied heavily on the Illinois Grabinger decision decided
less than two months previously. Again, the Allen court found
that the public interest in proper police protection by a competent and properly disciplined police force outweighed the private
interests of the individual policeman. 103 And again, this decision
was arrived at by citing language from Grabinger without any
explanation of how the affording of due process protections
would inhibit the discipline of the force. The Allen court further
relied on Grabinger by applying the same five factors. Although the Allen court did not enumerate the fifth factor,
the investigative nature of the hearing, as one of the bases for
its determination, the finding that the General Board of Inquiry
was an investigatory body and not judicial or quasi-judicial, was
04
central to the disposition of the case.1
court opinion in Grabinger with little discussion. 455 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1972).
10, 322 F. Supp. 873 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd 452 F.2d 489 (4th Cir.
1971).
102 Greensboro Police Force Departmental General Order No. 69-2.
103 322 F. Supp. at 876-77.
104 Both Grabinger v. Conlisk

and Allen v. City of Greensboro were cited
with approval by a Delaware district court in Boulware v. Battaglia, 344 F.
Supp. 889, 907 (D.C. Del. 1972), aff'd 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Allen appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'"1
which affirmed the lower court decision. However, the court of appeals was less definite in its holding that due process was not
violated and disagreed with the lower court on one very important aspect. The reviewing court found that the hearing procedure was not strictly investigatory. Rather, the appellate
court found that it served adjudicative functions as well. This
finding was not enough to reverse the decision, however, upon
examination of the specific factual situation before the Allen
court.
In affirming, the court of appeals relied on three peculiar
facts not present in the Grabinger case. First, Allen admitted
to the charges. The complainant was not present at the hearing
and her statement was admitted as hearsay - her version of
the incident was read by an investigation officer. The accused
agreed that these statements were "basically true," and accordingly, the reviewing court found that confrontation would have
been of little help. Second, Allen never made his desire to be
represented by counsel known until he appealed his demotion
to the city manager. Allen felt that the request would have
been pnavailing in the face of the specific prohibition against
the presence of counsel found in the governing order. The
appellate court noted that "[w]hile courts should not require
futile gestures for the sake of form, we might have a different
10 6
case had Allen requested that counsel be allowed to be present.'
Thus, the fact that Allen failed to protest the regulation denied
the police administration the opportunity to reconsider its
procedure. Third, in a footnote, 10' the reviewing court found
the Greensboro procedures to be distinguishable from those in
Grabingerwhere the most formidable action the reviewing panel
could recommend was a thirty day suspension, while the Greensboro Board could recommend complete dismissal. This observation seems to be misguided. At the time Grabingerwas decided,
the Complaint Review Panel could recommend Police Board
action; the Police Board in turn could take action resulting in
dismissal.10 8
The procedures upheld in the Boulware case provided substantially greater
protections than were afforded the plaintiffs in either Grabingeror Allen.
105 Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971).
106

Id. at 490-91.

Id. at 491.
General Order No. 67-21, § III-C-4 has since been amended by General Order No. 67-21E, § II-C to strike the words "Charges before the
107

108

Police Board" as one of the possible actions of the Complaint Review Panel.
But in view of other language in the order, it is not clear whether this

deletion prohibits such a recommendation by the Panel. Since the Police
Board hearings do provide all of the due process protections, it would appear
that an officer is in a better position constitutionally if more serious action is
recommended.
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Two other cases dealing with this due process issue challenged the discipline procedures of the United States Military
Academy. In White v. Knowlton1"9 six cadets sought to enjoin
the Superintendent of the Academy and the Commandant of
Cadets from separating them from the Academy. White and the
other plaintiffs were threatened with dismissal for violating the
Cadet Honor Code which mandates: "A cadet will not lie,
cheat or steal nor tolerate those who do." The allegation of
cheating11 ° was referred to a self-policing body, the Cadet Honor
Committee. Upon the Committee's adverse finding, a de novo
hearing was held before a Board of Officers, which affirmed the
finding.
The plaintiffs contended that both the hearing before the
Honor Committee and that before the Board of Officers were
conducted in a manner which denied them due process of law.
While the Regulations for the United States Military Academy
provide for the convening of a Board of Officers, they do not
mention the formulation of the student Honor Committee. Apparently this step of the procedure developed by tradition and
appears in a memorandum issued by a commanding officer.,"
In part, the cadets alleged a denial of their right to procedural
due process during the hearing before the Honor Committee
in that they were given inadequate notice of Committee proceedings and of the specific charges and evidence against them,
they were not advised of their right to remain silent, they were
not provided with the assistance of counsel while preparing for
their appearances before the Committee, and they had no opportunity to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses nor to
present witnesses on their own behalf. The cadets challenged
the adequacy of the Board of Officers hearing in that the
Board was composed of graduates of military academies and was
thus biased against plaintiffs, and that a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof was not applied nor was a unanimous
decision of the Board required.
The New York district court first noted a basic flaw in the
plaintiffs' allegation that unconstitutional procedures were employed by the Honor Committee. The cadets failed to show that
the Committee's determination played an integral part in the
manner in which the Board of Officers conducted the case or in
109 361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
110 The plaintiffs were scheduled to take a physics exam consisting of

short-answer questions. The questions were identical to those given to another group of students earlier in the day, but the order in which the questions appeared was scrambled.

Each of the plaintiffs' exam papers showed a

high correlation to the correct answers for the earlier exam so as to suggest

advance knowledge of the questions.
MnThe various documents setting forth the procedure are fully outlined
in the opinion.
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the determination of whether plaintiffs would be allowed to continue their military careers. In acting upon the plaintiffs' premise that Academy tradition established the Committee as a necessary part of the separation process, the court analogized the situation to that of a grand jury. The court noted that, except for the
right to remain silent, none of the rights allegedly denied plaintiffs are available at a grand jury hearing. The claimed right
to remain silent was disposed of by pointing out that there was
no suggestion that anything said by any of the plaintiffs before
the Honor Committee was used, or even referred to, at the Board
of Officers hearing.
The court likewise found no due process violations in the
manner in which the Board of Officers hearing was conducted.
The contention that the Board, made up of Academy graduates,
was biased was dismissed as being frivolous. The court construed the various regulations as requiring only substantial
evidence, and not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, to support
a finding of an Honor Code violation. And, since the proceedings
were not criminal, neither the criminal standard of proof, nor
the requirement of a unanimous verdict, were applicable.
Thus, the procedures employed in separating White and the
other cadets from the Academy did not constitute a denial of due
process. A year earlier the same district court came to an opposite conclusion in Hagopian v. Knowlton.2
Joachim Hagopian, a third-year cadet at the United States
Military Academy, sought a preliminary injunction preventing
his expulsion from the Academy for amassing an excess number of demerits. The cadet alleged that the procedures employed
in the separation proceedings violated his Fifth Amendment right
to due process.
The court was concerned with demerits classified as Class
III Delinquencies. These represented offenses at the lowest level
of culpability such as being in need of a haircut and wearing an
uncleaned uniform. The court found it significant that the
Company Tactical Officer, Hagopian's immediate supervisor, not
only was in a position to report these rule infractions, but also
acted upon the report and reviewed his own action. The decision
for expulsion was made by an Academic Board based on the
Tactical Officer's recommendation and a written statement submitted by Hagopian. Nothing in this procedure provided for the
taking of evidence or testimony from witnesses, nor was legal
counseling available.
Another important consideration was the introduction of the
subjective questions of "potential" and "attitude." The plain112

346 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tiff's written submissions and hearsay statements from others
were held insufficient - interjection of these subjective factors
required an evidentiary hearing. This merger of prosecutorial
and judicial functions in the Tactical Officer and the absence of
an evidentiary hearing was found to fall short of the due process
standard where the cadet faced the prospect of expulsion. Significantly, the court supported the constitutional right to pro11
cedural due process and the availability of a fair hearing. 3
Although both the White and Hagopian decisions examined
the rights of United States Military Academy cadets, neither
opinion mentioned the military-discipline argument so heavily relied on in Grabingerand Allen. The theories on which these cases
were decided vary in other respects as well. The district court in
Allen rejected claims of Fifth Amendment violations on the basis
that due process rights did not attach to the situation before the
court. The appellate court, however, found that due process
rights were applicable but that the requirements of the protection were afforded the plaintiff in Allen. Furthermore, the appellate court specifically disagreed with the holding that the hearing
was merely investigatory. Rather, they found it to be both investigatory and judicial in nature noting the significance of the
fact that the final discretion rested with the city manager.
These cases constitute the essence of decisional law concerning the extent to which due process protections impact disciplinary proceedings held in a military-like atmosphere. The opinions are based on different theories and disagree on major points.
The disparity between. the holdings of Grabinger and Allen
as to the nature of the hearing does not appear to create a conflict of sufficient magnitude to move the Supreme Court to decide
the due process question. A federal court of appeals case
squarely in conflict with these decisions may induce a grant of
certiorari. Until the issue is thus brought into focus and a
definitive ruling is rendered by the Supreme Court, the onus of
change lies elsewhere.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois legislature has the power to effect a change in
the thirty day language of the present statute." 4 As the statute
now reads, full due process protections are afforded only where
a policeman may be discharged or suspended for a period of more
13 Id. at 34. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision,
though on somewhat different reasoning, referring to the Academic Board as

the body which makes the "fateful recommendation."
470 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1972).
114 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-18.1 (1971).

Hagopian v. Knowlton,
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than thirty days. Where the suspension is for thirty days or less,
an officer is bound to the limited protections afforded at a hearing
before the Complaint Review Panel. Action by the General
Assembly could extend the coverage of the statute to encompass
all suspensions regardless of their length.
In view of the apparent influence exerted by the Chicago
superintendent of police over the legislature, it is unlikely that
the law-making body will be so moved. This influence is illustrated by legislative action taken during the reign of 0. W.
Wilson as superintendent of police. For example, it has been
suggested that Wilson desired the title of "superintendent of
police" as opposed to "chief of police." 5 0. W. Wilson took over
the administration of the Chicago Police Department in 1960.
Prior to that time, the administrative head of the city's force was
called the "chief of police."6 The statute denominating him as
such was repealed on May 29, 1961. The present vesting provision, using the term "superintendent of police," was enacted
on the same date, less than one year after Wilson took office.
It would seem that legislative action will await the approval
of the superintendent. An alternative and more expeditious
way of eradicating the inequities in the present disciplinary procedures is direct action by the superintendent. Through his
legally sanctioned general order power, he controls the discipline
procedures of the Chicago Police Force. His primary ground for
denial of full due process rights can only be the military-discipline argument. Interestingly, in the two United States Military
Academy cases discussed, this argument was not advanced to
sustain the courts' holdings. Moreover, the argument has been
1 1' 7
expressly rejected in at least one other military academy case
As noticeable as ex-Superintendent Wilson's influence is in
the statutes, it is even more pronounced in the present general
order. General Order No. 67-21, issued by Wilson, states:
The purpose of this order is to establish procedures for handling
complaints and disciplinary actions 'against members of the Department under the following policies:
A. Discipline is a function of command.
B. Prompt and thorough investigation of allegations of misconduct must be made so that the facts may be established and
appropriate action taken either to clear the innocent or discipline the guilty. Corrective action must be timely to be effective.
C. A well disciplined force is one that voluntarily and ungrudgingly conforms to all Department rules and orders. It follows
115oW. TURNER, THE POLICE ESTABLISHMENT 110 (1968).
116 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 14-4 (1959).

117 O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), holding that a
Merchant Marine Academy regulation prohibiting cadets from marrying
violated due process guarantees.
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that the best disciplined force is least in need of correction
and is, therefore, the least punished.
D. While violations of rules, regulations, or orders require disciplinary action, the motive of the offender will be taken into
consideration in fixing an appropriate punishment. Was there
an evil, dishonest, immoral, or selfish motive or did the violation result inadvertently from a nonvenal human frailty such
as ignorance, forgetfulness, oversight, or the pressures of
domestic life complicated by the misfortune to which we are
all heir? Justice will be1 8tempered with mercy when the heart
of the offender is right.,
In the second edition of Wilson's book on the administration of a
police force, the following language can be found: "Discipline is
a function of command ....
" and "[t] he best-disciplined forces
are the best trained and therefore the least punished." 119 Other
parts of General Order No. 67-21 are also excerpts from the
21 0published works of 0. W. Wilson.

These excerpts are illustrative of the military-discipline
doctrine.

In

these same books. Wilson propounds additional

principles which contravene the military-discipline position:
The wise leader wins the support of his force to his policies,
plans, and procedures before placing them into effect. The imposition on operating personnel of procedures not understood and
approved by them nearly always results in failure. Even the most
excellent plan will not be operated satisfactorily by unsympathetic
policemen.
The [superintendent], therefore, should not inflict on his force
policies and procedures which the members are not prepared to
approve and accept. He should first win their approval. When his
proposals are sound, the approval is usually gained without difficulty; resistance to the plan may be evidence of its unsuitability
and indicates the need for a reassessment or modification of it.121
The police administrator is understandably reluctant to give
up his wide discretion.
It is a natural tendency to guard it
jealously.122 But it is just as reasonable to conclude that if he
relinquishes it voluntarily, he will come closer to attaining his
objectives of high morale and good discipline, than if he is forced
to give it up.

In the absence of a judicial ruling or legislative action, the
superintendent is free to continue denying due process protections to certain admonished policemen. The influence of 0. W.

Wilson's theories predominate in the present disciplinary pro118 General Order No. 67-21, § I.
119 0. W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 173 (2d

ed. 1963).
"He should not be represented by an attorney but he should be
permitted to obtain the services of any member of the force to represent him."
120E.g.,

0. W. WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 242 (1952).

21 Supra note 119 at 14-15.
Wilson agrees. See 0. W. WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 227-28 (1952);
0. W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 212 (3d ed. 1972).
122
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cedures and these practices have been continued by Wilson's successor, James Conlisk, in his amendments to the general order.
On November 1, 1973, Superintendent Conlisk resigned
and James Rochford has been named as his replacement.
Perhaps the new superintendent of police will loosen the bounds
of tradition by exerting his influence over the legislature or,
preferably, by taking direct action in revising General Order No.
67-21 to afford full due process protections at all disciplinary
proceedings.
Margaret Grabowski

